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WERNER

F.

EBKE*

Article VIII, Section 2(b), International
Monetary Cooperation, and the Courts
I. Prologue
The rise of article VIII, section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)' is an unparalleled phenomenon in international law. The history of international law reveals no other provision that has had
such an impact. In some forty years, the provision has carried along with it
academics who were once dismissive and judges who once rejected, misunderstood, or overlooked it. 2 Article VIII, section 2(b) is no longer a conflict solution
device associated solely with the Western Hemisphere countries. Instead,
countries on every continent, including socialist and developing countries, 3 are
*Referendar (J.D.), 1977, Doktor der Rechte (S.J.D.), 1981, Privatdozent, 1987, University of
Muenster School of Law; LL.M., 1978, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall). Professor of Law, Business and Tax Law Chair, University of Konstanz, Federal Republic of
Germany. Member, New York Bar. Associate Editor-in-Chief, THE INTRNATIONAL LAWYER.
1. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Second Amendment,
approved April 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter Articles of Agreement or
Fund Agreement]. The first sentence of art. VIII, § 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement provides:
(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member.
The original Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Bretton Woods Agreement)
took effect on December 27, 1945, the First Amendment on July 28, 1969, and the Second
Amendment on April 1, 1978. See Gold, Some Effects on PrivateParties and Private Transactions,
in PROSPECTSFOR INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND RESCHEDULINGS 13-1, 13-2 (J. Norton ed. 1988)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LENDING]. The text of art. VIII, § 2(b) has remained the same in all three
versions of the Articles of Agreement.
2. See generally W. EBrE, INTERNATIONALEs DEVISENREctrr (1989).
3. The People's Republic of China, Hungary, Romania, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and a number of
other socialist countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are members of the International
Monetary Fund. See R. EDwARDs, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 24-25 (1985). Poland,
which was one of the original members of the IMF, became a member again in 1986. See IMF,
ANNUAL REPORT 63 (1986). The Soviet Union participated in the Bretton Woods Conference, but did
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now subject to article VIII, section 2(b), and many of them implement the
provision judicially and administratively, though with substantial variations.
Each year sees new court decisions reviewing article VIII, section 2(b) and new
publications dealing with it. More and more frequently, arbitration tribunals, too,
take article VIII, section 2(b) into consideration. 4 Most importantly, the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States now
includes a provision on the enforcement of foreign exchange controls that
paraphrases article VIII, section 2(b). 5 As has been pointed out correctly, 6 this
is a significant development at a time where exchange controls are revived by
numerous countries as part of the effort to alleviate the burden of external debt
and to defend international monetary and financial structures. 7
When we deal with article VIII, section 2(b), we deal with a judicial oak that
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Neither the drafters of the
Articles of Agreement in 1944 nor the legislators of the IMF Member States,
when giving effect under their domestic law to article VIII, section 2(b) foresaw,
I suppose, the present state of the law with respect to article VIII, section 2(b).
Recent years have witnessed a rapid increase in actions in which article VIII,
section 2(b) has been invoked as a defense. Infrequent in the 1950s, such actions
have, by 1989, ripened into a complex body of law. Article VIII, section 2(b)
must, no doubt, rate as the most profoundly powerful instrument in the hands of
not become a member of the International Monetary Fund or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank). See 2 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965 5,
514 (J. Horsefield ed. 1969) [hereinafter 2 IMF HISTORY].
4. See, e.g., Arbitration Award of March 23, 1981, Private Arbitration Tribunal, 131 JOURNAL
DES TRtBUNAUX 727, 729 (1983). I should like to thank Philippe Malherbe, Esq., of Brussels,
Belgium, for bringing this case to my attention. See also Gold, The Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal and the Articles of Agreement of the InternationalMonetary Fund, 18 GEo. WASH. J. IN'r'L
L. & EcON. 537 (1985). For adetailed discussion of the arbitrability of art. VIII, § 2(b), see W. EBKE,
supra note 2, ch. 2. See also J.LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: A STUDY IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AwARDs 405-409 (1978); Sandrock, Are Disputes over the Application of
Art. VIII Sect. 2(b) of the IMF-Treaty Arbitrable?, 23 Im'L LAW. No. 4 (1989) (forthcoming).
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 822 (1988)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. For a critical analysis of the international monetary law provisions of the
Tentative Final Draft (July 15, 1982) of the Restatement, see Gold, The Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Revised) and International Monetary Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 3
(1988).
6. Silkenat, The Restatement and InternationalMonetary Law: The Practitioner'sPerspective,
22 INT'L LAW. 31, 32 (1988).
7. While the trend toward liberalization of the regulations governing foreign exchange and
capital transfers has continued in recent years and has been evident in both industrialized and
developing countries, many countries maintain exchange systems that are not free of restrictions on
payments and transfers for current international transactions and international capital movements,
including restrictions on portfolio investments, direct investments, and resident and nonresident
foreign exchange accounts. For a country-by-country analysis, see IMF, EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS &
EXCHANGE RESTRICrIONS 63-540 (1988) [hereinafter EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS]. For a succinct
overview of the decline of exchange controls during the first 25 years of the Fund's existence, see
M. GARRITsEN DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD 1945-85, at 30-39 (1986).
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courts and administrative agencies8 of the Member States of the IMF, designed
to foster, within the Fund, 9 the institutional objectives of international monetary
cooperation and collaboration at each stage of international business and finance
transactions. Without belittling the role of the judiciary, it is fair to say that legal
scholars have contributed greatly to the extraordinary development of the law as
to article VIII, section 2(b). The emerging theories of the enforcement of foreign
exchange controls under article VIII, section 2(b) demonstrate how influential
and authoritative a force legal scholars can be in the evolution and further
development of law.
A.

ARTICLE VIII, SECION

2(b),

LEGAL

SCHOLARSHIP, AND SIR JOSEPH GOLD

Sir Joseph Gold is probably the single most distinguished example of the
seminal role that legal writers have played, and continue to play, in the
intellectual upheaval of international monetary law. In more than 250 publications and numerous lectures, Sir Joseph has focused upon both the institutional t o
and the transactional" l aspects of the international monetary system. While he
has written and lectured extensively on all facets of international monetary law,
Sir Joseph has made no secret of the fact that his true love has always lain with
article VIII, section 2(b), the inherent conflict solution potential of which seems
to have fascinated him professionally and academically
from the very beginning
12
of his career as an international civil servant.
The question of whether and to what extent members and nonmembers of the
IMF are to give effect to exchange controls maintained or imposed by other states
has been a permanent practical as well as theoretical challenge to him. In his
untiring endeavor to help shape the post-World War II law of enforcement of
8. Art. VIII, § 2(b) is controlling on both courts and administrative agencies of the lMF Member
States. See Gold, supra note 1, at 13-61 n.5. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the practice of the
Member States' agencies in relation to art. VIII, § 2(b) is rather limited, partly because of the lack
of public reports of the agencies' activities with respect to the enforcement of exchange restrictions.
For this reason, this essay analyzes only the practice of the courts of the IMF Member States.
9. Art. VIII, § 2(b) does not apply in the relations between members of the IMF and
nonmembers. See G. DELAuME, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 72 (1988).
10. See, e.g., J. GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1988);
J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OFTHE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS,
vol. 1 (1979), vol. 2 (1984) [hereinafter 1-2 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS]. See also J. GOLD, THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF PAYMENTS: KEYNES, CONVERTIBILITY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND's ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT (1981); J. GOLD, VOTING AND DECISIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND (1972); J. GOLD, THE STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1970);

Gold, Developments in the InternationalMonetary System, the InternationalMonetary Fund and
InternationalMonetary Law Since 1971, 174 RECUEIL DESCOURS 107 (1982).
11. See, e.g., J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMErr IN THE CoURrs, vol. 1 (1962), vol. 2 (1982), vol. 3
(1986) [hereinafter 1-3 FUND AGREEMENT].

12. Sir Joseph joined the IMF staff on October 21, 1946. See Gold, Some Impressions of the
Early Fund, 21 FIN. & DEv. 23, 23 (1984).
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exchange restrictions, Sir Joseph has always been aware that an evenhanded and
impartial approach to the enforcement of restrictions on payments and transfers
14
3
for current international transactions' and on international capital movements
is needed to effectuate the Fund's objective of international monetary cooperation and collaboration. 15
In his first paper entitled The Fund Agreement in the Courts,16 Sir Joseph
attempted, on the basis of some early New York cases, to pierce the veil that
covered article VIII, section 2(b). Shortly thereafter, the paper appeared in
French in a prestigious French law review. 17 The second installment of The
Fund Agreement in the Courts18 was published in French as well.' 9 More
recently, some of Sir Joseph's articles on article VIII, section 2(b) have also
been translated into languages other than French, including German 20 and
Spanish. 2' As the body of law under article VIII, article 2(b) developed more
rapidly, some European law reviews published abbreviated versions of more
extensive studies of Sir Joseph in English, which gave his views an even
wider exposure.

13. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. VIII, § 2(a), art. XXX(d).
14. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § 1. For details of the IMF regime applicable
to capital movements, see R. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 394-96, 455-60; J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1977).
15. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, arts. I, IV, § 1. For thoughtful analyses of the
development of international monetary cooperation, see D. CARREAU, SOUVERAINETE ET COOPERATION
MONETAIRE INTERNATIONALE (1970); K. DAM, THE RULES OF ThE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982). For an economic analysis of the future perspectives on
international monetary cooperation, see De Grauwe, What Are the Scope and the Limits of Fruitful
InternationalMonetary Cooperation in the 1980s?, in INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND CREDIT: THE POLICY
ROLES 375 (G. von Furstenberg ed. 1983).
16. Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, IMF STAFF PAPERS 323-33 (1950-5 1).
17. Gold, Eapplicationdes Statuts du Fonds Mongtairepar les Tribunaux, 60 REVUE CRITIQUE
DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE [R.C.D.I.P.] 582 (1951).
18. Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-Il, IMF STAFF PAPERS 490-94 (1951-52).
19. Gold, Rdcente Application des Statuts du Fonds Mongtairepar les Tribunaux, 13 ANNALES DE
DROrr ETDE SCIENCES POLITIQUE 375-82 (1953).
20. See, e.g., Gold, Das Waehrungsabkommen von Bretton Woods vom 22.7.1944 in der
Rechtsprechung, 19 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUERAUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
[RabelsZ] 601 (1954); Gold, Das Waehrungsabkommen von Bretton Woods vom 22.7.1944 in der
Rechtsprechung-II, 22 RabelsZ 601 (1957) [hereinafter Waehrungsabkommen 11]; Gold, Das
Waehrungsabkommen von Bretton Woods vom 22.7.1944 in der Rechtsprechung-III, 27 RabelsZ
606 (1962).
21. See, e.g., Gold, Control de Cambios: Acto de Estado, Interes Pliblico, Los Articulos del
Convenio con el Fondo Monetario Internacionaly Otras Complicaciones, 6 REVISTA DELTRIBUNAL
FISCAL DE LA FEDERACION 1053 (1985); Gold, Algunos Efectos de los Articulos del Convenio
Constitutivo del Fondo Monetario Internacionalen el Derecho InternacionalPrivado, 14 ANUARIO
DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD IBEROAMERICANA 295 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Gold, The International Monetary Fund and the International Recognition of
Exchange ControlRegulations: The Cuban Insurance Cases, 1967 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 523; see also
Gold, The Bretton Woods Agreement of July 22, 1944 in the Courts-IV 38 RabelsZ 683 (1974).
Gold, Interpretationby the InternationalMonetary Fund of its Articles of Agreement, 16 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 289 (1967).
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In 1962, the IMF published the first collection of articles written by Sir Joseph
between 1951 and 1962.23 The concepts and problems to which article VIII,
section 2(b) gives rise are exposed with such moderation and felicity of
expression in these articles that they remain essential reading today, notwithstanding the wealth of writing which has succeeded them. In 1982 and 1986, the
Fund published the second 24 and third25 volume of The FundAgreement in the
Courts.
It is primarily because of the publication of selected essays in book form and
the appearance of translations of some of his articles in European law journals
that commentators and courts of IMF Member States outside the Englishspeaking world became familiar with Sir Joseph's work, his ideas and conclusions. In a remarkable and admirable effort, Sir Joseph in turn kept abreast with
the multifarious developments of the jurisprudence and the legal literature with
respect to article VIII, section 2(b) and carefully analyzed, and sometimes
heavily criticized, 26 court decisions and arbitral awards that applied, or should
have applied, article VIII, section 2(b).
Sir Joseph's broad-based comparative approach to the growing body of case
law vividly illustrates that while they are distinct, the domains of legal science
and practice complement each other. Sir Joseph is a living example of the
proposition that legal science and practice are partners, and that their successful
cooperation constitutes the best applied science and the best sort of legal
theory. 27 His studies also evidence that, at least as far as the enforcement of
exchange controls is concerned, comparative law as a method is far from having
what has been called an identity crisis.28
B.

THE PUROSE

My essay has a modest intent. Rather than plunging into the delicate issues
that have arisen in connection with the interpretation of the elements of article
VIII, section 2(b) by the courts of various IMF Member States and illustrating
how the courts have tackled the enforcement problems that are common to
most, 29 the essay explores how the fundamental inconsistency between the
governmental recognition of the objectives which the IMF as an institution is to
23. 1 FutND AGREEMENT, supra note 11.
24. 2 FuND AGREEMr, supra note 11.
25. 3 FuND AGREEMETr, supra note 11.
26. See, e.g., Gold, "Exchange Contracts," Exchange Control, and the IMF Articles of
Agreement: Some Animadversions on Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 33 Irr'L & COMP.
L.Q. 777 (1984).
27. See M. GLE-NDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIvE LEGAL TRADmONS: T h,
MATERIALS AND CASES 10 (1985).

28. Id.
29. For a detailed analysis of the issues, see 1-3 FUND AGREEMEN, supra note 11. See also
W. EBEE, supra note 2; R. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 477-90; F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY
372-401 (4th ed. 1982); Gianviti, Le contr6le des changes dtrangers devant le juge national (Part
FALL 1989
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foster, and the judicial disregard of them by the courts of some IMF Member
States in their interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) can be overcome. In his
publications and lectures, Sir Joseph has repeatedly bemoaned this inconsistency
and has argued strongly in favor of uniformity of interpretation of article VIII,
section 2(b). 30 He made this point particularly forcefully in two papers prepared
for the conference on Exchange Controls and External Indebtedness: Are the
Bretton Woods Concepts Still Workable,31 which took place in April 1984 in
Washington, D.C. under the auspices of the American Society of International
Law. 32 It is, therefore, more than appropriate in this article, which is dedicated
to Sir Joseph, to contribute to Sir Joseph's endeavor of advancing the institutional objectives of the Fund at the transactional level of international business
and finance where article VIII, section 2(b) applies.
The primary objective of this essay is to suggest that article VIII, section 2(b)
is not merely entrusted with the maintenance of the existing and future systems
of exchange restrictions carrying the Fund's endorsement 33 and with preserving
the smooth functioning of these systems by means of mutual recognition of the
restrictions, but the Articles of Agreement in general and article VIII, section
2(b) in particular should also be used to encourage and stimulate progressive
developments within the Fund and in the relations between IMF members and
non-members toward an ever closer international monetary cooperation. While
article VIII, section 2(b) as a principally transaction-related provision may not
ultimately transform the institutional objectives of the Fund, it may well be able
judicially to create a normative atmosphere within which an acceptance of the
need for a coherent political, economic, and legal acceptance of the objectives of
the IMF can grow, both institutionally and transactionally. It was the perception
of the drafters of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 that only global thinking
and planning well ahead into the future can achieve a perspective on international

1-11), 69 R.C.D.I.P. 479, 659 (1980); Williams, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of Exchange Control
Regulations Under the InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319 (1975); Note,
The Unenforceability of InternationalContracts Violating Foreign Exchange Regulations: Article
VIII, Section 2(b) of the InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 967 (1985).
30. See, e.g., 3 FUND AGREEMr, supra note 11, at 623-32.
31. Gold, Exchange Controls and External Indebtedness: Are the Bretton Woods Concepts Still
Workable?, 7 Hous. J. INr'L L. 1 (1984) [hereinafter External Indebtedness]; Gold, Exchange
Control:Act of State, Public Policy, the IMF's Articles of Agreement, and Other Complications, 7
Hous. J. INT'L L. 13 (1984) [hereinafter Exchange Control].
32. The papers presented at the Conference are published in 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
33. The term "endorsement" includes both "approval" and "authorization." If an IMF
Member State restricts payments and transfers for current international transactions within the
meaning of art. XXX(d), it needs the approval of the IMF under art. VIII, sec. 2(a). If a restriction
on payments and transfers on current international transactions has been maintained since the
Member State joined the Fund, either in the original form of the restriction or with no more than the
adaptation of it to changing circumstances, and if the Member State avails itself of the transitional
arrangements of art. XIV, § 2, the restriction is authorized by the Articles of Agreement without the
necessity for approval by the Fund. See Exchange Control, supra note 31, at 20.
VOL. 23, NO. 3

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION, AND THE COURTS

683

monetary problems and prospects. 3" The same unconstrained reformist thinking
is also needed within the courts and administrative agencies of the IMF Member
States to revitalize the idea of international monetary cooperation and collaboration in connection with private international business and financial transactions. In this process of reform, there are, without question, still numerous
undiscovered possibilities for enhancing the roles and perspectives of the law
with respect to article VIII, section 2(b) and of lawyers in service to the future
of international monetary law.

II. The Raging Controversy: Macro Objectives
versus Micro Motives
Before the gap that exists between the institutional objectives of the IMF and
their implementation within international business and finance transactions is
addressed, a closer look at article VIII, section 2(b) and the legal environment
within which it operates may be helpful.
A.

THE

REVOLUTION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

Article VIII, section 2(b) is a truly revolutionary provision. It constitutes a
radical departure from the traditional (pre-Bretton Woods) view of the courts of
most countries, namely that exchange control regulations, like tax and penal
laws, are entitled to recognition only in the territory of the state that promulgated
them. 35 Under article VIII, section 2(b), by contrast, a court or administrative
agency of an IMF member state may not disregard another Fund member's
exchange controls even if an "exchange contract" is, by its terms or by virtue
of the choice-of-law rules of the forum, not subject to the laws of the member
state maintaining or imposing the controls. 36 Furthermore, a Fund member may
34. For details of the Bretton Woods Conference and its prehistory, see 1 IMF HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 3-118; see also M. GARRITSEN DE VRMIS, supra note 7, at 5-20; Gold, Keynes and the
Articles of the Fund, 18 FIN. & DEV. 38 (1981).
35. The pre-Bretton Woods rule, never precisely analyzed but quite regularly followed, was
derived from Lord Mansfield's famous dictum in Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 58 Eng. Rep.
1120 (1775). For a more detailed exposition of the so-called "revenue rule," see A. LoWENFELD, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYsTEM 366-67 (2d ed. 1984).

36. This point was made very clear as early as 1949 in the Decision of the Executive Board of
the IMF of June 10, 1949, which thus far is the only decision that interprets art. VIII, § 2(b). See
Ex. Bd. Dec. No. 446-4 of June 10, 1949, in IMF, SELECrED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 273-74 (12th issue 1986) [hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS], reprintedin 14 Fed. Reg.
5208 (1949). In explaining art. VIII, § 2(b) in this decision, the Executive Board of the Fund stated,
inter alia, that:
such contracts will be treated as unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private
international law of the forum, the law under which the foreign exchange control
regulations are maintained or imposed is not the law which governs the exchange
contract or its performance.
SELECTED DECISIONS at 274. The decision of June 10, 1949 was issued under art. XVIII of the original
Articles of Agreement (Bretton Woods Agreement) which, in amended form, is now art. XXIX.
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not, as a general rule,37 refuse to enforce another member's exchange controls on
the ground that recognition of them would be contrary to the public policy (ordre
public) of the forum. 38 Last, not least, article VIII, section 2(b) binds all
members of the IMF, whether or not they are availing themselves of the
transitional arrangements in accordance with article XIV, section 2. Thus, even
members that have notified the Fund that they are not yet prepared to undertake
the obligations set forth in article VIII, sections 2, 3 and 440 are bound to
recognize a defense based upon article VIII, section 2(b); provided, of course,
the conditions of the provision are met. Where article VIII, section 2(b) applies,
it preempts other statutory or judicially created principles of choice of law. a t
Numerous international treaties reinforce the obligations assumed by the
members of the IMF under the Articles of Agreement, including the obligations
under article VIII, section 2(b). Thus, for example, the Friendship Treaty
between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany of 195442
provides that "no provision of the present Treaty shall be applied in such a
manner as to alter arrangements applicable to either Party by virtue of its
37. An exception to the general rule should be recognized if, but only if, an exchange control
regulation carrying the Fund's endorsement is applied, by the Member State that has maintained or
imposed it consistently with the Fund Agreement, in a manner which is designed to discriminate, or
in effect discriminates, against individuals or groups of persons on the grounds of race, color, creed,
religion, nationality or age. See Ebke, Book Review, 42 JuRisrENzErruNG [JZ] 456, 456 (1987). In
such cases, courts should, however, examine first whether art. VIII, § 2(b) applies. Only if all of the
conditions of art. VIII, § 2(b) are met is there room for the further question of whether the particular
exchange control regulation has been applied in a discriminatory manner that is so unacceptable to
the forum as to warrant resort to public policy (ordre public). The case J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays
Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 333 N.E.2d 168 (1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 866 (1975), is an unfortunate example of the proposition that courts of many IMF Member
States tend to resort too easily and prematurely to public policy (ordre public) to cope with foreign
exchange controls that are discriminatory or confiscatory in nature. See also 3 FUND AGREEMENr,
supra note 11, at 415-17.
38. See Ex. Bd. Dec. No. 446-4 which states:
An obvious result of the foregoing undertaking is that if a party to an exchange
contract of the kind referred to in Article VIII, Section 2(b) seeks to enforce such a
contract, the tribunal of the member country before which the proceedings are brought
will not, on the ground that they are contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the
forum, refuse recognition of the exchange control regulations of the other member
which are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.
SELECTED DEcisIONS, supra note 36, at 274.

39. See Ex. Bd. Dec. No. 446-4, id., which, in pertinent part, states: "By accepting the Fund
Agreement members have undertaken to make the principle mentioned above effectively part of their
national law. This applies to all members, whether or not they have availed themselves of the
transitional arrangements of Article XIV, Section 2."
40. As of January 1, 1989, 65 of the 151 members of the IMF have accepted their obligations
under art. VIII, §§ 2-4, whereas 86 members are availing themselves of transitional arrangements
under art. XIV, § 2. See Letter from Sir Joseph Gold to Werner Ebke (Jan. 5, 1989).
41. This point is made particularly clear in art. 3(2) of the new German Statute of Private
International Law of July 25, 1986, 1986 Bundesgesetzblatt (German Official Gazette) [BGBI] 1
1142.
42. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America
and the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839; T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
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membership in the International Monetary Fund." 43 The Code of Liberalisation
of Current Invisible Operations of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) 44 and the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital
Movements45 contain comparable provisions. Similarly, the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community (EEC) 46 of 1957 makes it perfectly clear
that it does not intend to affect the obligations of the Community's Member
States arising from international agreements concluded before the entry into
force of the EEC Treaty. 47 The Member States of the EEC have agreed, however,
that to the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the EEC Treaty,
they will take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities. 48
The multiple reinforcements of the obligations of the members of the IMF
reflect the international acceptance of the significance of the macro objectives
that the Fund is intended to foster. As set forth in article I of the Articles of
Agreement, the IMF aims at promoting international monetary cooperation,
facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, stability
and equity in the exchanges, the convertibility of currencies, the availability of
resources to give members the opportunity to correct imbalances in their
balances of payments and shortening the duration and lessening the degree of
disequilibrium in balances of payments. 49 Additionally, article IV, section 1
recognizes that it is an essential purpose of the international monetary system "to
provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital
among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth." 50 It also recognizes

43. Id. art. XII, § 2.
44. See CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS art. 4 (OECD 1988), which
reads: "Nothing in this Code shall be regarded as altering the obligations undertaken by a Member
as a Signatory of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or other existing
multilateral international agreements."
45. See CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS art. 4 (OECD 1988).

46. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
47. Id. art. 234(1). The Federal Republic of Germany and the other five original Member States
of the European Economic Community (i.e., Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The
Netherlands) accepted their obligations under art. VIII, §§ 2-4, on February 15, 1961. See 1 IMF
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 481. See also M. GARRITSEN DE VRIES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT

1945-1986, at 31 (1987). Today, Greece and Portugal are the only EEC Member States that are
availing themselves of transitional arrangements under art. XIV, sec. 2. See EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 7, at 544-47.
48. EEC Treaty, supra note 46, art. 234(2). For a detailed analysis of the possibilities that the
Commission and the Member States of the European Communities have to remedy violations by a
member state of obligations arising under the EEC Treaty, see Ebke, Enforcement Techniques Within
the European Communities: Flying Close to the Sun with Waxen Wings, 50 J.Am L. & CoM. 685
(1985).

49. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. I. For a more detailed discussion of the IMF's
objectives, see Gold, Public International Law in the InternationalMonetary System, in PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE FUTURE WORLD ORDER (Liber Amicorum in Honor of A.J. Thomas, Jr.)

15-1, 15-6 to -7 (J. Norton ed. 1987).
50. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV, § 1.
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as a principal objective of the IMF the "continuing development of the orderly
51
underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability."
While the various purposes stated in article I and article IV, section 1 are to a
considerable extent interdependent and overlapping and, in some cases, conflicting with each other, a principled and considered evaluation of each of them
at the various stages of governmental, judicial, or administrative action or
inaction will eventually contribute to the attainment of the purposes. 52
B.

THE KEY ELEMENT: "EXCHANGE

CONMTAcTs"

Despite their general acceptance of the need for international monetary
cooperation and collaboration and their general support of the Fund's macro
objectives, the members of the IMF are apt to be deflected by national interests.
The events preceeding and immediately following the "closing of the gold
window" in 197 153 are classic examples in support of this proposition.5 4 The
deflection is not, however, confined to the institutional level of international
monetary cooperation and collaboration. At the transactional level, too, the
courts of the Member States occasionally have not been sympathetic to the macro
objectives when, for the time being, they should have taken precedence over
micro interests of the forum. While they seem to realize that the objectives of
international monetary cooperation and collaboration may require, at least
temporarily, enforcement of exchange restrictions that have been approved by the
Fund or are authorized under the Articles of Agreement, national egoism and
special interests, such as the desire to strengthen the domestic financial markets
and to protect local creditors against exchange controls of other members, can
become so dominant as to lead courts of the IMF Member States to take a rather
restrictive view with respect to article VIII, section 2(b). 5 The current debate of
whether international loan agreements are "exchange contracts" within the
meaning of article VIII, section 2(b) vividly illustrates this point.

51. Id.
52. For a more detailed exposition of this view, see J. GOLD, THE RuLE OF LAw IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5-7 (1980); see also Gold, supra note 1, at 13-70.

53. For a vivid description of the events, see A. LOWENFELD, supra note 35, at 113-43. See also
Gold, Strengthening the Soft InternationalLaw of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443,
447-50 (1983).
54. See generally Gold, The Legal Structure of the ParValue System, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
155 (1973); Gold, UnauthorizedChangesof ParValue and FluctuatingExchangeRates in the Bretton
Woods System, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 113 (1971); see also Gold, Law and Reform of the International

Monetary System, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 371, 389-92 (1975).
55. See Zamora, Recognition of Foreign Exchange Controls in InternationalCreditors' Rights
Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAw. 1055 (1987). In reviewing U.S. cases that have favored
a narrow interpretation of the phrase "exchange contracts," Professor Zamora concludes that "[t]his
creditor-oriented view may be seen to strengthen U.S. financial markets, but it does not necessarily
accord with the goal of international monetary cooperation that the Fund Agreement was intended to
foster." Id. at 1065. See also External Indebtedness, supra note 31, at 10-11.
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Although Judge Meyer, in his dissenting opinion in Weston Banking Corp. v.
Turkiye GarantiBankasi,56 is sympathetic to a broad interpretation of the phrase
"exchange contract," which would include international lending transactions, no
court in the United States has adopted such a view. 57 It is well settled today in
United States case law that loan agreements do not fall within the ambit of article
VIII, section 2(b). 58 As a result, in international lending cases, exchange
controls of IMF Member States cannot expect the protection in the United States
that article VIII, section 2(b) was intended to grant even if the controls carry the
Fund's endorsement. If it is determined that a transaction is not an "exchange
contract," a court will normally proceed in accordance with traditional choiceof-law principles. 59 These principles were typically developed before internaless favorable to
tional monetary cooperation and, consequently, are normally
6
foreign exchange controls than article VIII, section 2(b). 0
The courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, by contrast, have
traditionally been much more receptive to defenses based upon article VIII,
section 2(b). The vast majority of the more than 25 article VIII cases that have
been reported in Germany, 61 since Germany became a member of the IMF
some 35 years ago, 62 favor a broad, debtor-oriented interpretation of article
VIII, section 2(b), especially of its key words "exchange contract." As early as
56. Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1204 (N.Y. 1982)
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
57. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 822 comment b.
58. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 900
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220,
371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 333 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Banco do Brasil, S.A. v.
A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d 235 (1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); accord Note, supra note 29, at 998-99. Contra Santucci, Sovereign
Debt Resolution Through the International Monetary Fund: An Alternative to the Allied Bank
Decision, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (1985); Williams, supra note 29, at 338.
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 822 comment c.
60. See, e.g., Domke, Foreign Exchange Restrictions (A Comparative Survey), 21 J. COMP.
LEois. & INT'L L. 54 (1939); Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws,
56 HAgv. L. REv. 30 (1942); see also Cabot, Exchange Control and Conflict of Laws: An Unsolved
Puzzle, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 476 (1951).
61. The term "Germany" is used in this essay as an abbreviation for the Federal Republic of
Germany, including West Berlin. The German Democratic Republic, like the Soviet Union, is not a
member of the IMF.
62. Germany became a member of the IMF on August 14, 1952. See Gold, The Group of Five
in InternationalMonetary Arrangements, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86, 98
n.65 (B. Cheng & E. Brown eds. 1988). See also Law Authorizing Membership of the Federal
Republic of Germany in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of July 28, 1952, 1952 BGBI.II 637, 728. It is well settled today that art.
VIII, § 2(b) is also binding on the courts and administrative agencies of West Berlin. See Judgment
of July 8, 1974, Kammergericht [KGI (Court of Appeals), Berlin, 1974 DIE DEUTSCHE RECHTSPRECHUNO AUF DEMGEBIET DESINTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS [IPRspr] 364, 365. For a discussion of the
negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the IMF regarding the representation of
West Berlin in the Fund, see J. GOLD, MEMBERSHIP AND NON-MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MONrARY FUND 418-22 (1974). For a thorough analysis of the legal status of Berlin, see I. HENDRY
& M. WOOD, THE LEGAL STATUS OF BERLIN (1987).
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1954, the Court of Appeals of the State of Schleswig-Holstein stated that only a
broad construction of the phrase "exchange contract" is consistent with the
objectives of the International Monetary Fund. 63 More recently, the Court of
Appeals of Berlin, too, has made it very clear that only the broad reading of
article VIII, section642(b) "takes adequate account of the economic sense of the
Fund Agreement.''
These and other recent cases are based upon the assumption that if the
exchange controls of an IMF member state carry the Fund's endorsement, their
efficacy should not be undermined by judicial disregard of them. Most
contemporary commentators in Germany seem to share this view. 65 German case
law supports the proposition
that international contracts for the sale of goods or
the rendering of services, 66 licensing agreements, 67 sureties (Buergschaften)68
and guarantees (Garantien)69 are "exchange contracts" within the meaning of
article VIII, section 2(b). There is language in some recent cases that written
acknowledgments of debts (Schuldanerkenntnisse),70 international money collection agreements, 71 contracts for the international movement of capital 72 and
even present gifts 73 may also be held to fall within the ambit of article VIII,
section 2(b).
63. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1954, Oberlandesgericht [OLG] (Court of Appeals), SchleswigHolstein, 1954-1955 IPRspr 463, 465.
64. Judgment of July 8, 1974, 1974 IPRspr at 366.
65. See Kohl, Zur Anwendbarkeit von Art. VIII Abschnitt 2(b) des Abkommens von Bretton
Woods, 6 PRAMOS
DESINTERNATIONALEN
PRIVAT- UNDVERFAHRENSRECHTS 285, 286 (1986).

66. See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 28, 1959, OLG, Hamburg, 1958-1959 IPRspr 547, 548;
Judgment of Dec. 28, 1954, Landgericht [LG] (District Court), Hamburg, 1954-1955 IPRspr 467,
470; see also Judgment of June 24, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], W. Ger., 1970 IPRspr 333,
334.
67. Judgment of July 5, 1978, OLG,Bamberg, 1978 IPRspr 309, 311.
68. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1970, BGH, W. Ger., 1970 IPRspr 327, 328; Judgment of Oct. 17,
1986, OLG, Munich, 32 RECHT DFR INTERNATIONALEN WRTSCHAFr/AUSSENWIRTSCAFrSDIENST DE
BETREIBSBERATER [RIW/AWD] 998, 999 (1986).
69. See Judgment of May 21, 1964, BGH, W. Ger., 1964-1965 IPRspr 574, 576 (suggesting
that guarantees are "exchange contracts" if they are "very closely related" to the underlying debt);
see also Judgment of July 11, 1961, KG, Berlin, 1966-1967 IPRspr 618.
70. See Judgment of Jan. 30, 1986, BGH, W. Ger., 1986 IPRspr 276, 278 (dictum).
71. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has expressly
left open the question of whether a money collection agreement is an exchange contract. See
Judgment of Mar. 8, 1979, BGH, W. Ger., 1979 IPRspr 473, 476.
72. The question remained open in a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Germany. See
Judgment of Dec. 21, 1976, BGH, W. Ger., 1976 IPRspr 342, 345. Many commentators in Germany
support the proposition that art. VIII, § 2(b) applies not only to restrictions on payments and transfers
for current international transactions, but also to restrictions on capital movements. See, e.g., Coing,
Inlaendische Werte und auslaendisches Devisenrecht: Zur Anerkennung von Artikel VIII 2(b) des
Abkommens von Bretton Woods, 26 WERTPAPIERMrrrE1LUNGEN [WM] 838, 840-41 (1972); Kohl, supra

note 65, at 287; Mann, Der InternationaleWaehrungsfonds und das InternationalePrivatrecht, 36
JZ 327, 329 (1981); Ruessmann, Auslandskredite, Transferverbote und Buergschaftssicherung, 37
WM 1126, 1127 (1983).
73. See Judgment of July 8, 1974, KG, Berlin, 1974 IPRspr 364, 366 (the court left open the
question of whether the transaction in question was a present gift or a loan).
VOL. 23, NO. 3

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION, AND THE COURTS

689

Although the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) has never had an
opportunity to rule on the issue of whether international law agreements are
"exchange contracts" within the meaning of article VIII, section 2(b), 74 some
lower German courts have held, or at least implied, that international loans are
"exchange contracts." Thus, for example, the Court of Appeals of the State of
Schleswig-Holstein, some 30 years ago, assumed without any discussion that
international loans are within the purview of article VIII, section 2(b). 75 In a
more recent case, the Court of Appeals of Berlin applied article VIII, section
2(b) to
a transaction that, at least according to the plaintiff's complaint, was a
76
loan.
In light of its broad construction of the phrase "exchange contract" in other
cases and the favorable view that it has taken generally toward debtors in
exchange control cases falling within the ambit of article VIII, section 2(b), it is
fair to assume that the Bundesgerichtshof, the highest German court in civil
matters, is likely to hold that loan agreements are entitled to the protection
granted by article VIII, section 2(b), if the conditions of the provision are met.77
Legal advisors seem to agree that this is a possible scenario. As a result, the
parties to international loan agreements hardly ever choose German law as law
governing their contractual relationship, 78 even though Germany is a major
international lender.79
International loan agreements are typically made subject to New York law and
submitted to the jurisdiction of New York courts. The preference for New York
74. In a recent case, the Court expressly left the question open for future consideration. See
Judgment of Dec. 21, 1976, 1976 IPRspr at 343.
75. See Judgment of Apr. 1, 1954, OLG, Schleswig-Holstein, 1954-1955 IPRspr at 463.
76. See also Judgment of July 8, 1974, 1974 IPRspr at 366. The defendant, on the other hand,
claimed that the underlying transaction was a present gift.
77. The German legal literature is split on the issue. Some German commentators have argued
that loan agreements are "exchange contracts." See, e.g., C. EBENROTH, BANKING ON THE ACT OF
STATE: INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 43 (1985); Foerger, Probleme des Art.

VIII Abschn. 2b des Abkommens ueber den InternationalenWaehrungsfonds im Realkreditgeschaeft,
24 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 309, 310 (1971). ContraF. MANN, supra note 29, at 382,

384; Coing, supra note 72, at 841. Because of the lack of authoritative judicial guidance, some
German commentators have refused to express an opinion on the issue in question. See, e.g.,
C. HINSCH & N. HORN, DAS VERTRAGSRECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN KONSORTIALKREDrrE UND PROJEKTFINANZIERUNGEN 117 (1985); Bosch, Vertragliche Regelungen in internationalen Kreditvertraegen als
risikopolitisches Instrument: Erfahrungen im Licht der juengsten Laenderumschuldungen, 1985
KREDrr utND KAPrrAL 117, 140-41 (spec. issue no. 8).

78. See R. Tzeschlock, Rechtswahlklauseln in internationalen Finanzierungsvertraegen unter
Beruecksichtigung zwingender Eingriffsnormen 1 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Konstanz School of Law 1988).
79. See O'Brien, Roles of the Euromarket and the InternationalMonetary Fund in Financing
Developing Countries, in ADJUSTMENT AND FINANCING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE ROLE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL MoNTrARY FUND 136, 141 (T. Killick ed. 1982). For the various approaches to external
debt management, see, e.g., M. GARRITSEN DE VIES, supra note 47, at 187-278; ADiusTMENT POLICIES
AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN THE ARAB WORLD (S. EI-Naggar ed. 1987); ExTERNAL DEBT
MANAGEMENT (H.

Mehran ed. 1985); EXTERNAL DEBT, SAVINGS,

AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA

(A. Martirena-Mantel ed. 1987).
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does not, however, result from the creditor-oriented construction of article VIII,
section 2(b) by the New York courts alone, but is facilitated by procedural and
substantive measures taken by the New York legislature. In this context, it is
desirable to keep in mind the New York legislation of 1984.80 This legislation
permits parties to substantial commercial contracts to stipulate the application of
New York substantive law to the parties' rights and duties, 81 the parties'
submission to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, and the entertainment of
the case by the New York courts whether or not the forum-non-conveniens
doctrine might, without this legislation, dismiss the action.82
The general aim of the 1984 legislation is to placate commercial interests,
especially in New York City, with facilitated resort to New York substantive law
and to the New York courts, at least where all parties agree to it, in cases
involving contracts which, for want of New York contracts by more traditional
measures, could not, even with the stipulation, assure either an application of
New York substantive law or a resort to the New York courts. 83 If coupled with
the creditor-oriented restrictive interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b), the
generous and unorthodox 84 substantive and procedural rules of 1984 create an
environment that is extremely favorable to creditors of major international
commercial transactions. It is, however, the major transactions that typically are
of utmost importance to countries that have balance-of-payments problems or
lack adequate resources of foreign currency and therefore depend upon exchange
restrictions and their recognition by the courts of other IMF Member States to
lessen their problems.

80. For details, see D. SIEGEL, NEw YORK PRACtICE 5-6 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
81. Under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989), if the minimum amount stated in
this provision (i.e., $ 250,000) is satisfied, the choice of New York substantive law is permissable
notwithstanding the fact that the case's contacts with New York would otherwise not suffice under
'U.C.C. § 1-105(1) for an application of New York law.
82. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 327(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1989). In order for the New York courts to exercise jurisdiction without facing the

doctrine of forum non conveniens, the case must be worth at least $ 1 million.
83. See Crddit Franqais International, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 128
Misc. 2d 564, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1985), where the court stated:
New York, as a center of international trade and finance, has expressly recognized, as
a service to the business community, that its courts will be hospitable to the resolution
of all substantial contractual disputes in which the parties have agreed beforehand that
our neutrality and expertise should govern their relationships. Just as the dollar has
become the international standard for monetary transactions, so may parties agree that
New York law is the standard for international disputes.
84. In cases other than substantial commercial contract cases, by contrast, New York courts have
employed the forum non conveniens doctrine rather liberally. Thus, for example, it has been held that
there can be a forum non conveniens dismissal in a case in which all parties are New York residents.
See Westwood Assoc. v. Deluxe Gen., Inc., 53 N.Y.2d 618, 438 N.Y.S.2d 774, 420 N.E.2d 966,
aff'g 73 A.D.2d 572, 422 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (App. Div. 1979). It has also been said that an action may
be ejected from a New York court on the grounds of forum non conveniens even if a more appropriate
forum is unavailable. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 467
N.E.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985).
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The courts of those IMF members that are not as receptive to defenses based
upon article VIII, section 2(b) as the German courts apparently assume that the
economic, political, institutional and normative frame of the international
monetary system will prove to be durable enough to cope with judicial decisions
that may be seen to further private interests and give weight to micro motives of
the forum, but do not necessarily accord with the macro objectives of the Fund.
Yet, no matter how noble the motives of the judiciary may be, judges do not
write for individual cases alone. When they decide actual cases in which the
existence of exchange controls carrying the Fund's endorsement is raised as a
defense, judges are contributing to the formation of a jurisprudence that will
directly affect similar cases in the future, not merely the case before the court.
Most importantly, the effects will not only be felt in the jurisdiction in which the
decision was rendered. Instead, given the competition between and among the
Member States of the IMF, the interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) by the
courts of one member state will almost inevitably affect the jurisprudence of
other Member States.85
Recent English cases interpreting article VIII, section 2(b) are probably the
best example in support of this point. In Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v.
Terruzzi, 86 Lord Denning, M.R., sitting on the English Court of Appeal,
endorsed the narrow interpretation of "exchange contracts." His qualifying
statement that "monetary transactions in disguise" should be "caught by section
2(b)" 87 has not proved to be particularly helpful if viewed from the perspective
of debtors, the Fund, and IMF Member States that have felt it necessary to
impose exchange restrictions. Cases like United City Merchants (Investments)
Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada88 and Mansouri v. Singh8 9 demonstrate that the
potential for public interest considerations that is seemingly inherent in the
concept of "monetary transactions in disguise," has not been implemented by
English courts with the macro objectives of the Fund in mind. On the contrary,
as Sir Joseph has pointed out, English courts, like their American counterparts,
have limited the scope of9 article
VIII, section 2(b) "almost to the point at which
°
the provision vanishes.''

There is certainly a chance that courts of other IMF Member States will resort
to public policy (ordrepublic) to block the enforcement of judgments or arbitral
awards that, because of their narrow creditor-oriented interpretation of article

85. For a more detailed exposition of the competition argument, see External Indebtedness,
supra note 31, at 11.
86. [1976] 2 W.L.R. 418, 424 (C.A.); [1976] 1 All E.R. 817, 822.
87. Id.
88. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039; [1982] 2 All E.R. 720.
89. [1986] 2 All E.R. 619.
90. External Indebtedness, supra note 31, at 11.
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VIII, section 2(b), are considered by the jurisdiction in which enforcement is
sought to be so offensive to its own attitudes toward, and generally accepted
perceptions of, international monetary cooperation as to warrant a denial of
recognition. 91 The unsuccessful attempts of the British plaintiff in Wilson,
Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi 92 to enforce his English judgment against the
Italian defendant in Italy is the most prominent example in support of this
proposition. 93 Yet, the procedural devise of public policy is not in and of itself
strong and fundamental enough to ensure, on the part of all IMF Member States,
compliance with the institutional objectives of the Fund in the interpretation of
article VIII, section 2(b). Public policy is an "unruly horse" (Cardozo) and, in
the cases under discussion here, its success depends almost entirely upon the
situs of the property of the unsuccessful defendant. If the defendant's property
is located, at least in part, in the state that rendered the judgment or the arbitral
award, public policy becomes an absolutely blunt knife.
What is even more disturbing, from the Fund's perspective, is that the impact
that restrictive interpretations of article VIII, section 2(b) may have is not limited
to countries that are driven by the common desire to protect their attraction as
financial centers or their interests as major capital exporters. Instead, restrictive
interpretations of article VIII, section 2(b) by the courts of some IMF Member
States may also spread gradually to countries that are in a completely different
situation. The courts of these countries may, under similar or even different
circumstances, use the creditor-oriented holdings of the courts of other Member
States as a convenient argument in support of their own narrow interpretation of
article VIII, section 2(b).
The process of mutual influence is facilitated by modern legal communication
services and information devices such as LEXIS, WESTLAW, or JURIS. These
services make it possible for interested persons to gain access to all pertinent
cases and other relevant legal information without delay and irrespective of
national boundaries. Due to the increased international legal exchange, language
barriers that once might have been an unsurmountable obstacle to a comparative
approach to the development of law are becoming more and more obsolete. As
a result, court decisions that frame the law of the enforcement of exchange
controls under article VIII, section 2(b) in one IMF member state are given much
91. Virtually all legal systems will refuse recognition in the event that a judgment or arbitral
award, for one reason or another, violates the forum's public policy. See, e.g., Juenger, The
Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 21-23
(1988). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 482(2)(d), § 488(2)(b). For a detailed analysis of the
enforcement-of-judgment provisions of the Restatement, see Ebke & Parker, Foreign CountryMoney
Judgments and Arbitral Awards and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States: A Conventional Approach, 24 INT'L LAW. No. 1 (1990) (forthcoming).
92. [1975]2 All E.R. 649; [1976] 1 All E.R. 817; [1976] 1 Q.B. 683; [1976] 1 Q.B. 703 (C.A.).
93. See Judgment of Dec. 13, 1984, Corte de cassazione [Corte cass.], 22 RrvIsrA DI DutnrO
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PRO;ESSUALE [Riv. DIR.INT.PRIV.] 148 (1986); see also Judgment of June 2,
1984, Corte cass., 22 RIv. oRe. INT. PRoV.121 (1986).
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wider exposure today than one could expect some decades ago when the
migration of legal ideas and their adoption by lawyers in their capacities as
administrators or scholars may have been less common than it
judges, attorneys,
94
is today.
This is not to suggest that many court opinions involving the novel issues of
article VIII, section 2(b) reflect a considered and principled resort by court or
counsel to foreign authorities. On the contrary, it appears that the American,
British, and German cases dealing with article VIII, section 2(b) typically do not
refer to judicial decisions of other IMF Member States. The courts do, however,
rely upon them indirectly in that they generally rely heavily upon the pertinent
writings of comparativists, including, for example, Sir Joseph Gold, Dr. F. A.
Mann, and Professor Arthur Nussbaum whose conclusions are based upon
careful broad-based comparative analyses. The controversy as to the meaning of
the words "exchange contracts" itself rests, as96is well known, upon the rival
95
views of Professor Nussbaum and Dr. Mann.
Another example of the role of legal scholars in the shaping of article VIII,
97
In civil law
section 2(b) is the interpretation of the phrase "unenforceable."
systems, unlike the common law tradition, this phrase has no inherent meaning.
It is therefore not surprising that the courts of civil law countries have relied upon
comparative publications to discern the meaning of that phrase. For example,
shortly after Germany's accession to the Fund, some lower German courts,
98
relying upon Dr. Mann, held that "unenforceable" meant "legally void." This
view would preclude subsequent court proceedings by the plaintiff to enforce his
claim once the exchange restrictions that barred the claim in the earlier
proceeding had been withdrawn by the member state or ceased to be consistent
with the Articles of Agreement. It was not until 1970, that the German Supreme
99
Court had an opportunity to rule on the meaning of the word "unenforceable."

94. See generally R. SCHLESINGER, H. BAADE, M. DAMASKA & HERZoG, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES,

lkxr, MATERIALS 5-17 (1988).
95. See Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the InternationalMonetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421,
426 (1950); see also A. NUSSBAUM, MoNEY IN THE LAW, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 542-43 (1950)
[hereinafter MONEY].

96. See, e.g., F. MAN, supra note 29, at 377-79, 398-99; Mann, The PrivateInternationalLaw
of Exchange Control Under the InternationalMonetary FundAgreement, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 97,
102 (1953); see also Gold & Lachman, The Articles ofAgreement of the InternationalMonetary Fund
and the Exchange Control Regulations of Member States (A Note on the Moojen Decision), 89
JOURNAL DU DROIT INT. 3, 7-8 (1962).

97. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. VIII, § 2(b).
98. Judgment of Dec. 28, 1954, LG, Hamburg, 1954-1955 IPRspr 467, 470; accord Judgment
of July 7, 1967, LG, Hamburg, 1966-1967 IPRspr 626, 627; see also Judgment of Feb. 27, 1969,
OLG, Frankfurt, 1971 IPRspr 358, 361, rev'd, Judgment of Feb. 17, 1971, BGH, W. Ger., 1971
IPRspr 362, 363-64.
99. Judgment of Apr. 27, 1970, BGH, W. Ger., 1970 IPRspr 329, 330. In an earlier decision,
the Court had used the cryptic phrase of "assurance of legal protection" to circumscribe the word
"unenforceable." See Judgment of May 21, 1964, BGH, W. Ger., 1964-1965 IPRspr 574, 577.
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Citing with approval, among others, one 6f Sir Joseph's German articles,' 0othe
Court rejected the view that "unenforceable" was suppose to mean "void." The
court recognized that article VIII, section 2(b) did not require the courts to treat
"exchange contracts" as "null and void." Instead, the Court held that, under
German law, the phrase was to be regarded as a procedural requirement
(Prozessvoraussetzung)with which the plaintiff must comply to be entitled to
sue. 101

The two examples illustrate the special ethical responsibility that the
members of the small group of academic experts on the international monetary
system have toward the individuals, institutions, and states that are affected by
exchange restrictions. 10 2 They also demonstrate, however, that the judiciary's
choice is not one between a "wholesale importation" or complete refusal of
foreign ideas and views. The choice is more an eclectic one, depending on
which of the many elements of article VIII, section 2(b) is at issue or what
exactly is at stake.
In making the choice, courts do not seem to be influenced by the forum's
history of exchange restrictions. That is to say, countries that have a history of
exchange restrictions are among those most friendly to the provision, whereas
countries that have no or virtually no history of exchange controls are among
those least friendly to article VIII, section 2(b).'o 3 While American and German
case law may give some credence to the proposition that there is a correlation
between the judicial treatment of article VIII, section 2(b) and the forum's
history of exchange restrictions, 104 recent English cases support the theory that
there is no such correlation. Given a choice, English courts have taken a
relatively narrow view on the provision despite the United Kingdom's long-

100. See Gold, Waehrungsabkommen H, supra note 20.
101. See Judgment of Apr. 27, 1970, 1970 IPRspr at 330. The Supreme Court has since

repeatedly affirmed its procedural classification of the term "unenforceable." See, e.g., Judgment of
Dec. 21, 1976, BGH, W. Ger., 1976 IPRspr 342, 343; Judgment of Feb. 17, 1971, 1971 IPRspr at
364. In a recent decision, the Court stated that the procedural classification is "now well settled."
See Judgment of Mar. 8, 1979, BGH, W. Ger., 1979 IPRspr 473, 475. The lower courts share this
view. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 17, 1986, OLG, Munich, 32 RIW/AWD 998, 999 (1986);
Judgment of Feb. 16, 1983, OLG, Duesseldorf, 1983 IPRspr 307, 308, 309; Judgment of July 5,
1978, OLG, Bamberg, 1978 IPRspr 309, 310. The District Court of Hamburg followed the German
Supreme Court in its Judgment of Feb. 24, 1978, LG, Hamburg, 1978 IPRspr 304, 305. For a
discussion of the consequences of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the word "unenforceable,"
see infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
102. For a more detailed discussion of the ethical accountability of legal scholars with respect to
novel issues and emerging legal theories, see Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward
a Conceptual Framework, 40 SW. L.J. 775, 802 (1986).
103. See Gold, supra note 1, at 13-58 to -59.
104. The United States has never had a comprehensive system of exchange controls. See
D.

VAoTS,

TRANSNATIONAL BusimEss PROBLEMS 30 (1986). Germany, by contrast, has a long history of

exchange controls, starting with World War 1. See, e.g., H. HARTENSTEIN, DEVISENNOTRECHT (1935 &
Supp. 1936); A. LENHOFF, PRIVATRECHTLICHE PROBLEME DES DEvIsENNOTRECHTS (1932); C. MUELLER,
GRUNDRISS DER DEVISENBEW1RTSCHAFrUNG (1938).
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standing history of exchange controls. 10 5 It is therefore fair to conclude that, as
a general rule, the choice-influencing considerations do not seem to be primarily
subject to historical preferences or limitations, but rather to current perceptions
of the economic, monetary, political and social intertwining of the IMF Member
States and their judicial implementation at the transactional level where article
VIII, section. 2(b) applies.
D.

JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY

In light of the foregoing discussion, it becomes evident that judges of the IMF
Member States are ultimately responsible for effectively implementing the macro
objectives of the Fund, regardless of the micro motives of the forum or the
parties. To meet their special responsibility, judges need to bear in mind that the
macro objectives of the IMF are to be taken into account when article VIII,
section 2(b) is interpreted. 106 A too narrow construction of article VIII, section
2(b), especially of its key elements, may have a detrimental effect on the smooth
functioning, on a day-to-day basis, of exchange controls that are approved by the
Fund or authorized by the Articles of Agreement.
More importantly, because of inevitable leverage effects, restrictive interpretations also imperil the possibility of attaining the common objectives of the IMF
as set forth in article I and article IV, section 1 of the Fund Agreement. 0 7 As the
need for exchange controls increases, the number of cases in which the controls
are raised as a defense is also likely to increase. Consequently, the judiciary's
responsibility grows in proportion to the relative significance of the element of
article VIII, section 2(b) that is being interpreted and the number of cases
decided on the basis of a particular interpretation.
Regardless of how one looks at the responsibility of the judiciary and the
perspectives of international monetary cooperation and collaboration, interpretations of article VIII, section 2(b) that do not accord with the Fund's overall
objectives, impair the stability of the international monetary system and lessen
not only the confidence in the judicial system of the country rendering the
judgment, but also the respect for the Fund itself. Both those who advocate
international monetary cooperation and a public-interest approach to article VIII,
section 2(b) and who favor a system that stresses national sovereignty and the
resorting to traditional, more creditor-oriented conflict-of-laws principles will
agree that a gradual loss of confidence and respect will ultimately do more harm
than good to monetary cooperation and collaboration; these constitute one of the
pillars of the post-World War II international monetary system.
105. Gold, supra note 1, at 13-59.
106. R. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 489-90.
107. See also Exchange Control, supra note 31, at 48, stating that "[the restrictive interpretation
of [the] conditions [of art. VIII, § 2(b)] favored by some courts are unfortunate because they frustrate
the objectives of the provision."
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HI. The Transformation: Some Fundamental Problems
Conceptual problems, textual and contextual difficulties, and institutional
limitations cast some doubts on whether the courts of the IMF Member States are
actually in a position to meet their responsibility.
A.

THE

Two-TIER CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY COOPERATION

The tension that exists between the need to implement the macro objectives of
the IMF and the temptation of the Member States' courts to give weight to the
micro motives of the forum is rooted in the two-tier concept of international
monetary cooperation as created by the Articles of Agreement. From the outset,
the articles left it for the courts and administrative agencies of the Member States
to give effect to the fundamental objectives of the Fund in the context of private
international business and finance transactions and to seek the achievement of
those objectives at the transactional level to the fullest extent. 0 8s The two
amendments of the Articles of Agreement in 1969 and 1978109 have not altered
the separation of functions between the Fund and its Member States in this
respect. The primary responsibility to ensure that the objectives of international
monetary cooperation and collaboration are carried out in relation to exchange
controls carrying the Fund's endorsement has remained with the courts and
administrative agencies of the Member States, with virtually no sanctions of the
Fund looming ahead if the courts fail to live up to the standards envisaged by
the Articles of Agreement. 110 Conceptually, the courts and administrative
agencies of the Member States have a de facto monopoly of ensuring
compliance with the institutional objectives at the transactional level of
international business and finance. In this regard, they are the sole guardians of
the Articles of Agreement.
The fact that article VIII, section 2(b) is not directly applicable, 1" is
consistent with the concept stated. By requiring that the Member States take the
necessary steps to carry out or give effect, under their domestic law, to the
provision, the Articles of Agreement underscore the special responsibility that
the Member States and their courts have assumed regarding the implementation
of the macro objectives of the Fund in connection with the enforcement of

108. See Ex. Bd. Dec. No. 446-4, reprinted in SELECrED DECISIONS, supra note 36, at 273-74.
109. See supra note 1.
110. See generally R. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 39-42; Gold, The "Sanctions" of the
InternationalMonetary Fund, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 737 (1972).
111. Article VIII, § 2(b) is not directly applicable in the sense that it is to be regarded in courts
as equivalent to an act of the legislature. Rather, each member must ensure that the provision is
binding under its own law in accordance with the representation of original members under the
Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXXI, § 2(a), or in accordance with the corresponding
representation of other members under the resolutions that admit them to membership in the IMF. See
Gold, supra note 1, at 13-57, 13-94.
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exchange restrictions." 2 To enable the courts to fulfill their difficult task, the
Executive Board of the IMF' t 3 has made it clear that it will lend its assistance
regarding the interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) and that it is "prepared
to advise whether particular exchange control regulations are maintained or
imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement." 11 4 In addition, the Articles of
Agreement confer upon the Executive Board the power to interpret the Articles
of Agreement. 115 As early as 1949, the Board adopted Decision No. 446-4,
which clarifies the provision in a number of important respects. 116 While the
Executive Board has always been well aware of its power to interpret, the Board
has been very reluctant to use this power. The Decision of 1949 is the only one
that interprets article VIII, section 2(b), although
other decisions have an indirect
7
bearing on certain aspects of the provision.l
The reluctance of the Fund to use its interpretative power should not come as
a surprise to those who are familiar with the nature, scope and requisites of
interpretations within the meaning of article XXIX.118 The issuance of an
interpretation is a political step 1 9 to which the Fund seems to resort only under
special circumstances. 1 20 Given the political sensibilities of the Member States,
it is no wonder that it has always been thought to be a measure for which there
must be a special reason. In this context, one should also keep in mind that most
members of the Executive Board are economists and bankers, rather than

112. Not all members of the IMF seem to have taken the necessary steps to carry out or give effect
under their law to art. VIII, § 2(b). See, e.g., Gold, Australia and Article VIii, Section 2(b) of the
Articles of Agreement of the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), 57 AusTL. L.J. 560 (1983). For a
brief discussion of the legal position of art. VIII, § 2(b) in Mexico, see 3 FUND AGREEMENr, supra
note 11, at 177-78. The legal status of art. VIII, § 2(b) is also questionable in Sweden where the
legislature does not seem to have given effect to the provision. For details, see M. BOGDAN, SVENSK
INTERNATIONELL PRIVAT- OCHPRocEssRAr 71 n.8 (3d ed. 1987).
113. For the composition, powers, and functions of the Executive Board, see 2 LEOAL AND
1NsTrrunONAL ASPECTs, supra note 10, at 386-90.
114. See Ex. Bd. Dec. No. 446-4, reprinted in SELECaED DECISIONS, supra note 36, at 274. For a
discussion of the Fund's information practice, see 3 FUND AGREEMNr, supra note 11, at 633-60. The
Court of Appeals of Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany, is, as far as can be seen, one of the
few courts that have requested the Fund to provide an official statement that exchange restrictions of
Member States were in accordance with the Articles of Agreement. See Judgment of Dec. 15, 1965,
OLG, Karlsruhe, 1964-1965 IPRspr 583, 586; see also 1 IMF HISTORY, supra note 3, at 210-11. In
a more recent case, the District Court of Hamburg, too, has made an inquiry concerning the
compatibility of certain Ethiopian exchange restrictions with the Fund Agreement. See Domex, S.A.
v. Schlueter, Doc. No. 62 0 226/75. Shortly after the Fund's reply, the parties settled the case out
of court. See Letter from the presiding judge of the 12th Commercial Law Court, District Court of
Hamburg, to Werner Ebke (Apr. 13, 1987).
115. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXIX. For details, see R. EDWARDS, supra
note 3, at 37-39.
116. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
117. Gold, supra note 1, at 13-59, 13-68.
118. For a comprehensive analysis of the law of Fund interpretations under the original Articles
of Agreement of 1944, see J. GOLD, INTERPRETATION BYTHE FuND (1968).
119. 1 LEGAL AND INsTrrIrToNAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 302-13.

120. J. GOLD, supra note 118, at 3, 61.
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lawyers, and that they do not seem to regard themselves as charged with the task
of creating, adapting, or even applying international monetary law. 12 1 The result
is that there appears to be a greater emphasis upon political, economic, and
administrative measures than upon legal aspects. One should also recall that the
Executive Board's decisions are not considered to be binding on the courts of the
Member States, but are viewed by most courts as "persuasive" authority
only. 122 Accordingly, the Board cannot be certain that its interpretation will
ultimately reach the desired result.
Under those circumstances, the relative reluctance of the Executive Board to
adopt official interpretations is understandable. It would also seem to be legally
acceptable as there is no absolute obligation on the part of the Board to issue a
decision, even if it becomes apparent that article VIII, section 2(b) is not
interpreted uniformly throughout the Fund. As a general rule, the Executive
Board needs to weigh the desirability of the adoption of an interpretation against
the chances that the courts of the Member States will actually implement it.
Courts that have taken a restrictive view, with respect to article VIII, section
2(b), do not seem to be prepared to give great weight to even official
interpretations of the Fund if adherence to them would be contrary to the
perceived interests of the forum. Conversely, it is rather unlikely that the Fund
will, in the foreseeable future, issue an interpretation to clarify article VIII,
section 2(b) and to harmonize the. law of enforcement of exchange restrictions.
Consequently, changes of the law with respect to article VIII, section 2(b) are
not likely to be initiated by the Fund, but will have to come, if at all, from the
courts of the Member States as the guardians, in relation to private international
transactions, of the Articles of Agreement. Only if it is shown that the courts are
unable or unwilling to provide a coherent, fund-wide solution to the problem of
bridging the gap between the major objectives of the Fund and the actual
interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b), will there be a need for searching for
alternatives.
B.

LANGUAGE, HISTORY, AND OTHER COMPLICATIONS

Unfortunately, article VIII, section 2(b) itself does not facilitate the desirable
movement toward uniformity of interpretation on the basis of the Fund's macro
objectives. The language of the Articles of Agreement in general and of article
VIII, section 2(b) in particular has contributed much to the disparity of
interpretations. For example, the phrase "exchange contracts" is not a term of
121. See Gold, InternationalLaw and the IMF, 14 FIN. & DEV. 35, 37 (1977).
122. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1119 n.26 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v.
Bancomer, 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1473 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); MONEY, supra note 95, at 529, 542 n.44. But
see also 1 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 22-27, 55-59; B. KL.naER, INTERAnNATLEs
DEVISENSCIULDRECHT 154 n.177 (1985); J. GOLD, supra note 118, at 31-42; Gold, supra note i, at
13-63; Meyer, Recognition of Exchange ControlsAfter the InternationalMonetary FundAgreement,
62 YALE L.J. 867, 883 (1953).
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art, neither in the civil law system nor in the common law tradition. 123 Like other
similarly broad terms of multilateral treaty law, the words "exchange contracts"
derive their contours in and through national judicial processes. In the International Monetary Fund, unlike, for example, in the European Communities, 124
there is no court or comparable institution to which private parties can resort and
that could ensure, with authoritative force, uniformity of interpretation and
effective compliance with the macro objectives of the Fund in the interpretation
of article VIII, section 2(b) by the courts of the Member States. The search of
the courts of the IMF members for the "true" meaning of the phrase "exchange
contract" is complicated by the fact that English is the only authentic language
of the Fund Agreement.' 25 Accordingly, a comparison of various versions of the
Agreement, which is a commonly accepted method of interpretation of multilateral treaties, 126 would not seem to be particularly helpful where, as in the IMF,
there is only one authentic text. 127 This conclusion would seem to be accurate
share the same language have
despite the fact that some Fund members that
128
mutually agreed upon a particular translation.
Yet, it is not only the language of article VIII, section 2(b) that causes
problems. The context and the specific location of article VIII, section 2(b) in the
Articles of Agreement, too, are somewhat puzzling 129 and add little to confirm
the meaning of the phrase "exchange contract." The true import of the phrase
could perhaps more easily be ascertained if it were known what the drafters of
the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 intended to do and what their aims
were. 130 Regrettably, the historical background of article VIII, section 2(b), the
sought to be effected by the
travaux prcparatoires,and the changes in substance
13
drafters at Bretton Woods are not entirely clear. 1
The textual and contextual difficulties make it at least partially doubtful
whether the national influence can be totally overcome in the implementation of
123. But see In re United Rys. of Havana & Regla Warehouses, [1961] A.C. 1007.
124. For details of the role and functions of the Court of Justice of the EEC, see Ebke, supra note
48, at 713-715.
125. See Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund, R. C-13, reprinted in
BY-LAws, RuLEs AND REGULATIONS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND 24 (43d issue 1986).
126. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, p. 289, art.
33(2) (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention); see also W. BisHop, INTERNATIONAL LAw 174-75 (3d
ed. 1971).
127. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 33(2), which reads as follows: "A version of
the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered
an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree." For comments on the treaty
on treaties, see, e.g., Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1971).
128. But see 2 LEGAL AND INsTrrtiTIONAL AspEcts, supra note 10, at 6 (suggesting that a "second
language can contribute to a compromise even when there is only one authentic language, as in the
Fund"). For some recent translations, see 3 FuND AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 628-32.
129. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 477.
130. See Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 32.
131. On the history of the drafting of art. VIII, § 2(b), see 2 FND AGREEMEr, supra note 11, at
429-38.
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article VIII, section 2(b), in both the civil law and the common law traditions.
Even within the same legal tradition where traces of common genes exist, there
are numerous manifestations of mutations and acquired differences.
In their endeavor to shape the law, with respect to article VIII, section 2(b), the
courts of the IMF Member States resort to their own methods of construction and
rely upon translations of the provision into their own language. This is done even
though article VIII, section 2(b), like other provisions of multilateral treaty law,
should be interpreted "autonomously" on the basis of the authentic text and by
means of the comparative method.' 32 Accordingly, in effect, the elements of
article VIII, section 2(b) live in and through the law of the Member States. Yet,
even if they would apply the methods of autonomous and comparative interpretation and rely exclusively upon the authentic text, courts would still have to
transform the various elements of article VIII, section 2(b) into legal concepts of
the forum to give effect to the provision.
Consequently, there is always the danger that article VIII, section 2(b), in the
hands of disparate courts of different legal cultures, will develop along divergent
and uneven lines. This could occur even if the judges endorse the shared values
of the IMF. 133 An inherently consistent and coherent system of law, with respect
to the enforcement of exchange restrictions within the Fund, would thus seem to
be more a goal than reality; even if the interpretation is strictly teleological or, to
use a phrase of Sir Joseph, based upon the "economic rationale" ' 34 of the
Articles of Agreement.
German case law provides a ready example in support of this proposition.
German courts, without question, are among those courts that have gone out of
their way, in their interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b), to give effect to the
macro objectives of the IMF. The broad, debtor-oriented interpretation of the
words "exchange contracts" is perhaps the best evidence.1 35 There are,
however, numerous manifestations of substantial mutations in comparison with
the law of other IMF Member States. The mutations obviously result from the
transformation of the various elements of article VIII, section 2(b) into German
law. As has been pointed out, German courts, after trial and error, have come to
the conclusion that the phrase "unenforceable," which has no inherent meaning
in the German legal system, is best effectuated under German law if viewed as
a "precondition to suit," rather than a defense. 136 As a result, the plaintiff has
132. See Exchange Control, supra note 31, at 47.
133. For a discussion of similar problems within the European Communities, see Ebke, Les
techniques contentieuses d'application du droit des Communauts europdennes, 22 REvUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 209, 221 (1986).
134. Gold, supra note 1, at 13-73. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 31(1) which
reads: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."
135. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also 3 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at
262-87.
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the burden of proving that the exchange restrictions invoked by the defendant are
inconsistent with the Fund Agreement or that article VIII, section 2(b) does not
1 37
apply for other reasons.
The courts of most other IMF members, by contrast, are of the opinion that
article VIII, section 2(b) provides a defense. 138 Accordingly, the burden of
proving that the exchange restrictions in question are maintained or imposed
consistently with the Articles of Agreement and that all other conditions of the
provision are satisfied lies with the defendant. 139 As a further consequence of the
procedural classification of the word "unenforceable," German courts are
required, as a matter of law, to take cognizance of article VIII, section 2(b). 140
Thus, a German court needs to apply the provision ex officio once the parties
have stated substantiated facts that may give rise to an application of article VIII,
section 2(b), even if it is not raised as a defense by the defendant. This view is
in stark contrast to the law of most IMF Member States that treat "unenforceability" as a defense, where the parties would41 seem to be able to set aside
application of the provision at their discretion. 1
Apart from the burden of proof, the procedural implementation of the term
"unenforceable" by the German courts can have rather detrimental consequences for the plaintiff. The single most unfortunate consequence from the
plaintiff's point of view, no doubt, is that an "exchange contract" that did not
violate foreign exchange restrictions when entered into can become "unenforceable" as a result of subsequent modification or introduction of exchange
restrictions. For, as "preconditions to suit" must be met at the time of the "last
hearing" (letzte muendliche Verhandlung) of the case by the court,142 any
change in the exchange control laws of IMF Member States, other than Germany,
between the making of the contract and the "last hearing" can render the
43
contract "unenforceable." 1

137. See Judgment of Apr. 27, 1970, BGH, W. Ger., 1970 IPRspr 329, 332.
138. See 3 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 781.

139. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 901-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315,
456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 442 N.E.2d 1195 (Ct. App. 1982) (The Court stated, that "there is no proof, in
this record, that if the debt were not restructured, the bank would be barred from repaying the
plaintiff in Swiss francs as required by the terms of the note." 456 N.Y.S.2d at 689 [emphasis
added]).
140. See Judgment of Apr. 27, 1970, 1970 IPRspr at 332.
141. See also Gold, supra note 1, at 13-62 to -63.
142. See Judgment of Mar. 8, 1979, BGH, W. Ger., 1979 IPRspr 473, 475.
143. See Judgment of Apr. 19, 1962, BGH, W. Ger., 1962-1963 IPRspr 523. In this case, the
Court applied art. VIII, § 2(b) to a contract that was entered into on Mar. 1, 1948, and allegedly
violated Austrian exchange controls. Id. at 523-24. Austria did not join the Fund until August 27,
1948, however. See 2 IMF HISTORY, supra note 3, at 904. The flip side of the "last hearing" rule is,
of course, that an "exchange contract" that did violate foreign exchange controls when made, but
did not violate them at the time of the last hearing, is enforceable. See Judgment of Feb. 17, 1971,
BGH, W. Ger., 1971 IPRspr 362-64; see also Judgment of Mar. 8, 1979, 1979 IPRspr at 475;
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If one recalls that, in Germany, it takes an average of 41.4 months, from the
filing of a law suit with the district court, for an appeal case to be decided by the
Federal Supreme Court,'" it becomes evident that plaintiffs run a substantial risk
that their claims may become, at least temporarily, unenforceable. This risk goes
much beyond the risk that creditors have to assume in other IMF Member
States. 145 The risk is aggravated, under German law, by the fact that the statute
of limitations does not fall when the plaintiff brings an action that is eventually
dismissed as "unenforceable," even if the contract at issue was unenforceable when
made. 146 As a result, the statute of limitations may bar subsequent court proceedings
by the creditor-plaintiff in enforcing his claim against the defendant if the exchange
restrictions that precluded his previous action from being heard by the court, are
withdrawn, cease to be consistent with the Articles of Agreement or become otherwise
inapplicable after the statutory period of limitations has lapsed. 147 There does not
seem to be any other jurisdiction in which article VIII, section 2(b) may have similar
harsh effects on the outcome of "exchange contract" cases.
Whether or not one endorses the consequences as desirable, 148 the substantive
and procedural consequences of the German Supreme Court's transformation of
the phrase "unenforceable" into German law vividly illustrate that, because of
preexisting legal conditions and conceptual features of the law of the Member
States, uniformity of interpretation is difficult to accomplish, regardless of
whether or not the judges are supportive of the Fund's objectives. A certain
interpretation by a court of a member state of any given element of article VIII,
section 2(b) may, in that state, have inevitable legal consequences with respect to
a number of related issues of substantive or procedural law, affect the understanding of other elements of the provision and lead to results that differ
fundamentally from the law of other members.
Under those circumstances, is a coherent solution of the problem of the
extraterritorial recognition of exchange restrictions under article VIII, section
2(b) likely to come from the courts of the Member States? The transformation
problems discussed thus far would seem to require a negative response to the
Judgment of Dec. 21, 1976, BGH, W. Ger., 1976 IPRspr 342, 346. Accord L. HINSCH & N. HoRN,
supra note 77, at 118.
144. See REcHTSPFLEGE FACHSERiE 10, REIHE 2 (ZIVILOERICHTE UND STRAFGERIcHTE) 109 (Statistisches

Bundesamt ed. 1986). It takes an average of 10.1 months, from the filing of an appeal or the granting
of a writ of certiorari, for an appeal case to be decided by the Supreme Court. Id. For further dertails,
see Fuchs-Wissemann, Zur Geschaeftsbelastung der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit, 65 DEUTrscHE

RICmaGZarrUNG 386 (1987).
145. See 3 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 11, at 778-81.
146. See GERMAN CIVIL CODE (BUERGERLICHES GESEI-zBUci) of August 18, 1896, 1896 REICHSGEsErzaLArr (German Official Gazette) 195, § 212(1) (as amended).

147. But see GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 146, § 209(l), § 212(2). See also Judgment of July
3, 1980, BGH, W. Ger., 78 Entscheidungen des BGHs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1, 5 (1981).
148. Except for the statute-of-limitations problem and the burden-of-proof issue, the holdings of

the German courts would seem to be perfectly consistent with the macro objectives of the Articles
of Agreement.
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question. The overall institutional conditions and perspectives of the Fund do not
seem to allow a more favorable answer.
C.

INSTITUTIONAL CONDIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

The IMF, created in the mid-1940s as an economic and political necessity,
seeks to link 151 sovereign states of different sizes, cultural heritages, wealth
and aspirations. Its Member States seek to accomplish the objectives set forth in
article I and article IV, section 1 of the Fund Agreement under constantly
changing political, economic, monetary and social conditions in all parts of the
world. Given the multifarious differences and the diversity of outlooks represented in the Fund, the institutional objectives cannot be easily attained.
The Fund of the 1980s is acting as an aggregation of sovereign states intergovernmentally pursuing their own national interests under a common roof. They
do not act as members of an international monetary organization ,whose policies
are designed, and should be accepted, as a preferable supranational alternative to
national monetary policies. The outlook of the Fund is perhaps too closely
associated with sustaining particular positions and principles, reflecting a strong sense
of national identity and a preference for national as opposed to supranational and
institutional interests. This approach results in a constant attempt to seek achievable
goals that are compatible with the perceived interests of the Member States. Such an
approach leaves behind the idea of arriving at a single set of common objectives
without first focusing upon the perceived national interests of the Member
States
49
having major stakes in the Fund and corresponding voting powers. 1
The institutional conditions seem to be so influential at times as to preclude the
courts of some IMF Member States from concentrating on building a more
ambitious supranational consensus concerning the shape and implementation of
article VIII, section 2(b); even for those judges who endorse the objectives of the
Fund and the purposes of article VIII, section 2(b) and accept the need for a
purpose-oriented interpretation of the provision as a prerequisite to realizing
those objectives. As a result, the judiciary places stress upon technical solutions
and familiar concepts of domestic law that take account of perceived interests of
the forum and frequently appease local creditors, but disregard the normative
goals and overall political ends. It is not surprising that the legal advisors of the
150
defendants in Allied Bank Internationalv. Banco CreditoAgricola de Cartago
149. On the voting powers of the Fund's Member States, see Gold, Weighted Voting Power:Some
Limits and Some Problems, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 687 (1974). See also J. GOLD, VOTING AND DEcIsIONS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1974); Gold, The Origins of Weighted Voting Power in the
Fund, 18 FIN. & DEV. 25 (1981).
150. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
473 U.S. 934 (1985). For an excellent discussion of this case, see Rendell, The Allied Bank Case and
Its Aftermath, 20 INT'L LAW. 819 (1986). For a thorough analysis of the withdrawn decision, 733 F.2d
23 (2d Cir. 1984), see C. EBENROTH, supra note 77, at 45-60; Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing)
by Default: The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in International Business
Transactions, 19 INT'L LAW. 225 (1985).
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and Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco de Costa Rica 15 1 are more confident in advancing
surrounding it, than
the Act of State doctrine, notwithstanding the uncertainties
152
they are in dealing with article VIII, section 2(b).
As technical solutions gain the upper hand, policy and public interest
considerations become less and less important, and the urgently needed steps
toward the development of a coherent, internationally acceptable, and monetarily
sound interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) are simply not done. Under
those circumstances, it is no wonder that the idea that there is an international
public policy in relation to exchange restrictions, even when article VIII, section
2(b) does not apply,153 falls into oblivion.
One can only speculate how a more international attitude of the judiciary
toward article VIII, section 2(b) would have affected the law of extraterritorial
recognition of exchange restrictions within the Fund. It would seem to be
certain, however, that a more international approach to article VIII, section 2(b)
would ease, at least to a degree, the pressures inherent in the Fund's two-tier
system of international monetary cooperation.t 54 In such a system, conflicts or
unforeseeable events create a tension among competitive pressures that are
escalating in a period of severe imbalances of balances of payments of some,
but not all, Member States, where the need to employ exchange restrictions on
payments and transfers for current international transactions as well as capital
movements becomes inevitable. Under those circumstances, many more
nationally-minded courts seem to be tempted to view a purpose-oriented
interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) as a luxury rather than a necessity.
Cases such as Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago155 and Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco de Costa Rica' 56 are ready examples.
"But how," Sir Joseph has asked, "do loan contracts differ from deposit
contracts with banks in the interpretation of the provision? The attorneys for
banks, supported by U.S. official opinion, argued that article VIII, section 2(b)
applied to deposit contracts when the banks resisted enforcement of the
affected by the U.S. exchange control regulations that froze
contracts that were
'1 57
Iranian assets."
151. 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982), on remand, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). For a thoughtful
analysis of this case, see C. EBENROTH, supra note 77, at 61-82.
152. See Exchange Control, supra note 31, at 47. See also Buxbaum, The Effect of Foreign
Moratorium Orders on Bank Loans and Certificates of Deposits: The Act of State Defense, in
INTERNATIONAL LENDING, supra note 1, at 27-1, 27-4 to -10.
153. See Exchange Control, supra note 31, at 40. See also generally J. GOLD, THE FUND AND
NON-MEMBER STATES: SOME LEGAL EFFEcTs (1966).
154. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
155. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
473 U.S. 934 (1985).
156. 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982), on remand, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
157. External Indebtedness, supra note 31, at 11. For details of the United States Iranian assets
control regulation, see, e.g., Edwards, ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Iranian Assets
Control Regulation, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 870 (1981).
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The observations underlying Sir Joseph's question strongly support our
proposition that, given a choice, courts will almost without exception opt for a
solution that is consistent, or perceived to be consistent, with the forum's attitude
toward international monetary cooperation, the perceived interests of the forum,
and the judiciary's understanding of the interrelationship that exists between the
macro objectives of the IMF and the interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b).
If this proposition is accurate, it becomes evident that sweeping changes of the
law, with respect to article VIII, section 2(b), cannot be expected to come from
the judiciary. A fundamental reform of the law can only come from the
governments and the legislators of the Member States. Such a reform requires
some fundamental changes in perceptions, attitudes, conduct, expectations and,
perhaps, the Articles of Agreement.
IV. The Future of Article VIII, Section 2(b)
The preceding discussion shows that the question of the future of the law of
enforcement of exchange restrictions under article VIII, section 2(b) will be
settled ultimately by the cumulative weight of both the choices and decisions of
the judiciary and the institutional conduct of the IMF Member States. In this
context, it is worth noting that, because of increasing economic and monetary
difficulties, the Member States, like their courts, more and more frequently seem
to feel a sense of helplessness and futility about their capacity to influence the
conduct of other Member States and their courts for the sake of the common
objectives as set forth in article I and article IV, section 1 of the Fund
Agreement. These feelings result in an increasing willingness of at least some
courts not to conform, in their interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b), with
the goals of international monetary cooperation and collaboration. This occurs
even though they may well realize and recognize that even minor deviations from
the Fund's objectives in the interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) tend to
lessen public and private confidence in international monetary cooperation and
collaboration and that this lack of confidence in turn endangers the possibilities
of achieving the Fund's objectives as set forth in the Articles of Agreement.
While sharing a basic acceptance of the need for international monetary
cooperation and collaboration, the comparative studies of Sir Joseph 158 shows
that the judges of the IMF Member States do not share a common orientation
toward most issues to which article VIII, section 2(b) gives rise. A possible
exception is a shared and reciprocal acceptance of the necessity of some kind of
common perspective on the problems and prospects of the extraterritorial
enforcement of exchange controls. But even this fundamental assumption is not
always uniformly supported. On matters of substance, the potential realm of
agreement has been frequently demonstrated to be rather limited. In the courts of
158. See, e.g., 1-3 FUND AGREMEr, supra note 11.
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many Member States, national pressures and egotism appear to be so great as to
become the dominant actors.
Under those circumstances, the reality of the IMF and, more importantly, the
idea of international monetary cooperation and collaboration is at the disposal of
national forces determining the outcomes of exchange control cases. Upon
reflection, however, it would seem that the courts that implement the Fund's
objectives at the transactional level to the fullest extent, especially when working
together, actually are best situated to exert a variety of pressures, both political
and legal, which can close the gap between the macro objectives of the IMF and
the micro motives of the forum. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for the
Fund, for the international monetary system, and for the common goals of the
IMF members. Respect for the law of the Fund in general and article VIII,
159
section 2(b) in particular should thus be more than a platitude.
A.

THE GOAL: HARMONIZATION

Our observations lead us to the fundamental question of how much uniformity
is achievable under the regime of article VIII, article 2(b) and how much
flexibility is acceptable. Uniformity as an objective of article VIII, section 2(b)
has been more often stated than explained. While there has been some discussion
at the theoretical level of uniformity in interpretation as a policy, there has been
surprisingly little critical analysis of means and ways for its achievement and the
practical and conceptual difficulties involved. One must, of course, distinguish
6
between the nature of article VIII, section 2(b) as a conflict solution device, 0
and the need for uniformity in its interpretation.
Courts and commentators would agree that not all cases can be expected to be
adjudicated by the courts of the IMF Member States with exactly the same result;
i.e., in complete harmony with the holdings of the courts of all other Member
States. This is impossible given numerous textual and contextual difficulties
inherent in article VIII, section 2(b), the multifarious differences between the
substantive and procedural laws of the 151 Member States of the IMF, and the
need to transform the elements of the provision into the law of the member state
to give legal effect to the provision. 161 Some court decisions may go beyond the

1-5 (1981).
160. In Germany, as in other IMF Member States, there is some discussion as to whether art.
VIII, § 2(b) is a conflict-of-laws provision or a substantive provision of public international law. The
controversy should not be overestimated. Accord Siehr, Auslaendische Eingriffsnormen im inlaendischen Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht,52 RabelsZ 40, 70 n. 141 (1988). But see also 3 FUND AGREEMENT,
supra note 11, at 568-79. Sir Joseph is of the opinioin that "[t]he provision is probably not a rule of
private international law." Id. at 801. The answer to the problem depends upon the law of each
member state. Under German law, for instance, art. VIII, § 2(b) should be viewed as both a
choice-of-law rule, which preempts special statutory choice-of-law provisions as well as general
conflict-of-laws principles, and as a substantive provision with procedural implications.
161. For details, see supra note 111.
159. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBIuTY EC
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bounds of tolerance, but more often than not, one can accept a matter of
difference in result. In view of the transformation problems discussed, it is hard
to defend,a certain interpretation as the inevitable and only reasonably possible
way to settle the many issues presented by article VIII, section 2(b). Different
views often lead to different results. But this does not make any given
interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) necessarily unreasonable, unfair or
unjust. Accordingly, the goal of article VIII, section 2(b) cannot be uniformity,
but harmonization on the basis of the objectives of the IMF as set forth in article
I and article IV, section 1.
The need for a harmonization of the law of extraterritorial recognition of
exchange controls within the IMF is not an argument for any particular
interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) under any particular circumstances,
nor for the need of universal agreement as to what interpretation should apply.
Conversely, the fact that we have failed to achieve universal agreement on the
interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) is not an argument for the continued
application of the different interpretations that have developed in the IMF
Member States in the forty-four years of the provision's existence. If one is
willing to agree that judges can differ as to how article VIII, section 2(b) should
be interpreted, it becomes evident that one needs to start thinking about what are
the objectives of article VIII, section 2(b) in light of article I and article IV,
section 1, how those objectives can be clarified so as to ensure Fund-wide
implementation, and how the process of clarification can best be effectuated
within the Fund. Without a basic agreement among the IMF Member States and
their courts as to the exact objectives of article VIII, section 2(b), any judicial
choice or decision will be arbitrary, capricious, and result-oriented.
Many of the elements of article VIII, section 2(b) become clear as the existing
body of case law unfolds. However, without a Fund-wide clarification of the
ratio legis, the selection among the various interpretations is bound to be more
or less coincidental. As a result, the elements of article VIII, section 2(b) become
mere topoi. Article VIII, section 2(b) vests in the courts of the Member States
some interpretative power. The exercise of the interpretative power is a function
not only of what the provision says, but also what the Fund and its members
expect the courts to do in light of the objective of international monetary
cooperation and collaboration.
In this context, it should be noted that the law, with respect to the enforcement
of exchange controls, can be harmonized within the Fund without the help of a
uniform interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b). The necessary harmonization
can also be accomplished when a court applies general choice-of-law principles,
rather than article VIII, section 2(b); provided, of course, the general conflict
rules are as public interest-oriented as article VIII, section 2(b).
If the courts of the Member States recognize that public policy exists to
enforce exchange controls carrying the Fund's endorsement and shape their
general choice-of-law principles in accordance with this policy, they would
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contribute to a harmonization of the law of extraterritorial recognition of foreign
exchange controls within the Fund envisaged by article VIII, section 2(b). This
approach, no doubt, would require courts to wipe the slate clean of all the
traditional (pre-Bretton Woods) conflict-of-laws principles and theories and start
afresh. Such an approach would not necessarily assume that the traditional
principles were based on such mistaken assumptions and unachievable or
undesirable objectives as to make them substantially useless in the light of
today's better understanding of the monetary intertwining which cannot be
disentangled without self-inflicted hardship and the need for international
monetary cooperation and collaboration.
The better understanding today is, it seems to me, certain. Whether the
62
traditional conflict rules can and will be disregarded is, however, less certain. 1
Accordingly, a Fund-wide objective-oriented solution of the problem of extraterritorial recognition of exchange restrictions should come from within the
Fund. The solution would seem to require not only a simple reorientation on the
part of those who have favored a restrictive, creditor-oriented interpretation of
article VIII, section 2(b), but a concerted action of all Member States, which
should include the possibility of a revision of article VIII, section 2(b). However,
such a revision would be acceptable only if it would result in a new provision that
goes beyond the smallest common denominator.

B.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The present essay illustrates the difficulties that the courts of the IMF Member
States face when they attempt to implement article VIII, section 2(b) in a way
162. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 822 comment c, which states that "[i]f an exchange
control regulation is determined not to be maintained or imposed consistently with the Articles of
Agreement, a court would normally proceed in accordance with the pre-Bretton Woods approach to
" Id. But see also Judgment of Nov. 26, 1986, BGH, W. Ger., 1986 IPRspr
exchange controls ..
418. In this child support case, the German Supreme Court, applying general conflict-of-laws
principles, held that a parent who is residing in the Federal Republic of Germany is to fulfill his child
support obligations toward his child residing outside of Germany in a way consistent with the
exchange control regulations of the child's country of residence. In the case at hand, this was
Czechoslovakia which is not a member of IMF. Id. at 423. The Czech regulations required that
foreign parents pay the child support to their child residing in Czechoslovakia in freely convertible
currency. The child in Czechoslovakia was not to receive the foreign currency, but rather its
"equivalent value" in local currency or in the form of certificates which entitle the bearer to shop
in special stores carrying Western merchandise. Id. at 422. The German Supreme Court considered
the question of whether the Czech law violated the public policy (ordre public) of the forum, but
concluded that it was not "evidently contrary to [the forum's] perceptions of justice with respect to
the law of child support." Id. at 423. This holding is in conformity with the new German Statute on
Private International Law of 1986, supra note 41. According to art. 18(1) of the statute, child support
is subject to the law of the place of the "habitual residence" of the child. The court made it perfectly
clear, however, that its decision should not be cited in support of the general proposition that German
courts will automatically recognize the exchange control regulations of countries that are not
members of the IMF, if the regulations in question do not violate German public policy. 1986 IPRspr
at 422. Instead, the issue will be decided on a case-by-case basis.
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that is consistent with the institutional objectives of the Fund. While there is
room for criticism of many of the decisions involving article VIII, section 2(b),
it should be admitted that, in view of the complexity of article VIII, section 2(b)
and all the uncertainties surrounding the provision, the courts of the IMF
Member States, by and large, have done remarkably well. As David Pannick
recently stated in his challenging, critical study of the English and American
judicial systems, "[j]udges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what the
rest of us seek to avoid: make decisions." 163 One might add, it is almost always
easier to criticize a decision than to create one. A lawyer who wishes to gain the
respect of-his peers, clients, and students needs, however, to produce work that
is rooted in a careful and deliberate scrutiny of underlying conditions and
consequences.1 64 Unfortunately, judges very often have no choice but to
approach article VIII, section 2(b) with a view to the perceived interests of the
forum rather than with the economic rationale of the Articles of Agreement in
mind.
Legal writers, by contrast, are in a position to examine the theoretical,
historical, and economic foundations on which the law rests, to introduce new
thoughts into the legal discussion, to analyze carefully article VIII, section 2(b)
from a comparative point of view and to put the provision in the broader
perspective of the international monetary system as a whole. Academics,
however, are not in a position to determine which of their views will ultimately
prevail. The implementation of a thought is largely in the hands of lawyers who,
in their capacities as legislators, judges, and administrators, understand that law
must contribute to, rather than hinder, the solutions of the problems today and
prospects for tomorrow.
Sir Joseph deserves thanks for his unfailing efforts to lay the ground for a
future-oriented, public interest approach to the extraterritorial recognition of
exchange restrictions within the Fund. Courts that traditionally have been more
sympathetic to private or local interests in their interpretation of article VIII,
section 2(b), one hopes, will reorient their thinking and reconsider their views in
light of Sir Joseph's work. Because of the supranational character and multilateral nature of the Articles of Agreement, judges need to understand that they can
no longer feel champions of their own legal system (which, as every lawyer
knows, is the best in the world) and adhere to traditional (pre-Bretton Woods)
principles even though those principles have been substituted by new, internationally accepted rules of law. They need to be willing to overcome the
limitations of their national training and acquired legal language as only this will

163. D. PANNICK, JUDGES 1 (1987).
164. For a more detailed exposition of this view, see Ebke, Transnational Investments and
Germany's Value-Added Tax: A Statute in Search of Purpose, in CURRENT Topics INU.S.-GERMAN TAX
AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Liber Amicorum in Honor of Otto L. Walter) 207, 227-28 (H. Conston ed.
1988).
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enable them to focus upon the conceptual framework of the Articles of
Agreement in general and the economic and monetary significance of article
VIII, section 2(b) in particular. As this essay has demonstrated, the sweeping
changes of the law, with respect to article VIII, section 2(b), that may be
necessary in a number of IMF Member States, will have to come from an
amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement or from other concerted action of
all concerned. 165 Such concerted action will become increasingly necessary in an
electronically linked, global financial market.

165. Accord Zamora, supra note 55, at 1082.
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